This paper examines the role played by internal control and its five components (i.e., control environment, risk assessment, control activities, information and communication, and monitoring) in alleviating future stock price crash risk. Using a unique dataset from China, we find evidence that internal control is negatively associated with future stock price crash risk. Specifically, control environment and monitoring are significantly and negatively associated with future stock price crash risk. Moreover, the negative association between internal control and crash risk is significantly more pronounced in firms with weak internal and external governance (i.e., audited by non-Big 4 auditors, located in provinces with low market development, and less conservative in accounting) and with poor ability to mitigate impacts of extreme negative events (i.e., non-state-owned enterprises). Our study highlights the delicate role of internal control as a mechanism in preventing crash of stock price.
Internal Control and Stock Price Crash Risk: Evidence from China

Introduction
Corporate scandals and auditing failures, such as those of Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom, have motivated regulators to address the effectiveness of internal corporate controls. For example, Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX 404) requires public U.S. companies to disclose information on internal controls. Numerous studies examine how internal control weakness (ICW) is associated with the first and second moments of return distribution (i.e., average return, cost of capital, idiosyncratic risk, or systematic risk).
1 Few studies examine how internal control affects stock price crash risk (hereafter, crash risk), which is regarded as the third moment of stock returns. Crash risk is a large negative marketadjusted stock returns (Hutton et al., 2009; Jin and Myers, 2006) and is an undesirable characteristic of a firm for investors. More importantly, we know little about how the five components of internal control
proposed by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) affect crash risk. This study investigates these important and unexplored research issues.
We investigate whether firms with better internal control mechanisms are less prone to price crash.
According to COSO, internal control has five components, namely, control environment, risk assessment, control activities, information and communication, and monitoring. Prior studies document that control environment and information and communication reduce earnings management and enhance the quality of corporate disclosure (Chen, Dong, Han, and Zhou 2013) . Therefore, the control environment as well as information and communication can limit the ability of corporate insiders to withhold bad news, which lowers crash risk. Moreover, risk assessment helps managers evaluate risk accurately, thus preventing them from taking extreme risk, which leads to lower crash risk. Control activities help ensure that necessary actions are taken to address risks that may hinder firms from achieving their objectives. Such events eventually help reduce the probability of an extreme negative event, which is one of the most important triggers of price crash. Finally, monitoring means assessing the performance of the internal control system over time to ensure that the system functions well. Thus, monitoring strengthens the effects of the other four components of internal control on crash risk. In summary, we predict that internal control and its five components reduce crash risk.
Our measure of internal control is the internal control index developed by China's Xiamen
University. This index has been published annually in the three most influential financial newspapers in China: China Securities Journal, Shanghai Securities News, and Securities Times. The index is widely used and cited by media, auditors, listed companies, and scholars in China. 2 The internal control index is constructed by tracking the internal control information of a firm using financial statements, China
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) filings, government documents, and press releases. The index covers fully 99% of all of Chinese public firms from 2007 to 2010. More important, this index is further decomposed into the five sub-indexes of control environment, risk assessment, control activities, information and communication, and monitoring, thus enabling us to evaluate the strength of the five dimensions of internal control. Crash risk is proxied by the probability of extreme, negative firm-specific returns and the negative skewness of firm-specific returns (Chen, Hong, and Stein, 2001 and Kim, Li and Zhang, 2011a) . We use a sample of Chinese firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2007 to 2010 to conduct our analysis.
Our findings suggest that internal control is significantly and negatively related to crash risk.
Moreover, we document that the control environment component is negatively correlated with our two crash risk measures. Monitoring and information and communication components are significantly and negatively associated with one of the two crash risk measures. Risk assessment and control activities components are not significant with respect to any crash risk measures. That is, not every component of internal control has equal impact on the crash risk of a firm.
In addition, we investigate whether the negative association between internal control and crash risk is affected by internal and external monitoring, the ability to limit bad news hoarding, and the ability to mitigate the effects of extreme negative events. We find that the negative association between internal control and crash risk is significant (insignificant) when firms have weak (strong) internal and external governance (i.e., when audited by non-Big Four auditors or located in a province with low market development, respectively), weak (strong) ability to limit bad news hoarding (i.e., with less accounting conservatism), or weak (strong) ability to mitigate the effects of extreme negative events (i.e., non-stateowned enterprises (non-SOEs)). These results are consistent with the notion that the role of internal control in lowering crash risk is particularly important when internal monitoring by an auditor or external monitoring by the market is weak, when firms' ability to limit bad news hoarding is weak, or when firms' ability to mitigate the effect of extreme negative events is poor (i.e., non-SOEs). The results address a potential concern that the negative association between internal control and crash risk may be the outcome of corporate governance. We find that the negative association between internal control and crash risk exists only in firms with weak governance (i.e., low auditing quality and weak market development). Thus, the negative association between internal control and crash risk is not driven by firms with both good internal control and good corporate governance. Overall, this study supports the relation between ICW and crash risk. Zhou, Kim, and Yeung (2014) document that firms with ICW are more prone to crash than those without ICW. In contrast, Kim and Zhang (2014) find that ICW does not predict realized crash risk. Our study finds that internal controls help reduce crash risk, generating additional empirical evidence to support the regulation 3 . Third, our study documents that internal and external monitoring mechanisms, a firm's ability to limit bad news hoarding, and its ability to assuage the effects of extreme negative events influence the association between internal control quality and crash risk. This finding suggests that internal control can function well in reducing crash risk when strong internal and external monitoring are unavailable, when firm ability to limit bad news hoarding is weak, and when firms poorly mitigate the effects of extreme negative events. Finally, our study provides an important policy implication to securities market regulators. Our results suggest that internal control, especially its control environment, monitoring, and information and communication elements, plays an important role in determining crash risk and/or maintaining stability in the capital markets.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and develops the research hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample selection and specifies the research design. Section 4 describes the data and presents descriptive statistics and empirical results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
This study relates to two streams of the literature: (1) research that examines the determinants of crash risk, and (2) research that investigates the economic consequences of internal control. We briefly review these two streams and subsequently develop our research hypotheses.
3 We conjecture that there at least three reasons that could lead to different findings from Kim and Zhang (2014) . First, the proxy of internal control quality in the two US studies is a dummy variable, while ours is a continuous variable which could lead to more powerful tests. Second, our data comes from China, an emerging market with weaker legal institutions, poorer corporate governance environment, and less experience in risk management compared with the U.S. Thus, the marginal effects of internal control quality on crash risk might be greater in China, which makes us easier to detect the effects of internal control on crash risk. Third, as pointed out by Kim and Zhang (2014; p. 856) : "In untabulated tests, we find that ICW does not predict future realized crashes. This does not necessarily mean that ICW does not increase future crash risk; it may simply be that internal control-driven crashes have not materialized yet. More importantly, it does not mean that ICW does not increase investors' fear of future crash risk." Therefore, it's possible that internal control-driven crashes exist in both the U.S. and China.
Determinants of crash risk
The risk of stock price crash is the probability of extreme negative stock returns for a specific period, normally one year (Jin and Myers, 2006; Kim, Li and Zhang, 2011a, b (Kim, Li and Zhang, 2011a, b; Callen and Fang, 2013; Kim and Zhang, 2015) . Kim, Li and Zhang (2011b) find that tax avoidance facilitates managers' misbehavior that lead to higher future crash risk, such as rent seeking and withholding bad news. Moreover, these authors document that external monitoring mechanisms, such as analyst following and institutional investors, help restrain the behavior of managers, thus decreasing crash risk. Kim, Li and Zhang (2011a) expect that equity compensation motivates managers to withhold bad news, which leads to higher crash risk. Kim and Zhang (2015) report that accounting conservatism, that is, setting a higher degree of verification to recognize good news as gains rather than to recognize bad news as losses, can lower crash risk. Callen and Fang (2013) Such empirical and anecdotal evidence supports the view that hiding bad news eventually triggers stock price crash. To our best knowledge, no prior research investigates the effect of internal control components as an important mechanism in preventing the bad news withholding behavior of managers in relation to crash risk.
Economic consequences of internal control
Several previous studies investigate the economic consequences of internal control by exploiting SOX 404 disclosure as a research setting. Specifically, several studies document that firms with ICW are charged a higher cost of equity (Ogneva, Subramanyam and Raghunandan, 2007; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2009 ), public debt (Dhaliwal et al., 2011) , and private debt (Kim, Song and Zhang, 2011) 
Hypothesis development
The above discussion indicates that internal control is a mechanism that reduces information asymmetry and increases information transparency. Internal control reasonably ensures the effectiveness and efficiency of business, reliability of financial reporting, and compliance with laws and regulations (COSO, 1992) . COSO identifies five components of internal control. The internal control system and its five components may restrain crash risk because they conceptually reduce the likelihood of executives
hiding bad news. We analyze the effects of these five components on crash risk.
The control environment is the overall attitude, awareness, and actions of directors and managers regarding the internal control system and its importance to the entity. 
Sample Selection and Research Design
Sample data
Our sample consists of all publically traded Chinese firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2007 to 2010. We obtain all financial and stock market data from the China Stock
Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. The internal control data are obtained from the internal control index database developed by the internal control research center of Xiamen University (Chen et al., 2013) . Panel A of 
Measures of crash risk
We use two measures of crash risk based on Chen, Hong and Stein (2001) and Kim, Li and Zhang (2011a,b) . We first estimate firm-specific weekly return by regressing the following augmented market model for each firm in each year:
( 1) where is return on firm i in week and is return on the CSMAR value-weighted market index over week . We include the lead and lag returns of the market index to allow for nonsynchronous trading (Dimson, 1979) . The residual from Equation (1) captures firm-specific weekly return. We logtransform these highly skewed residuals to obtain firm-specific weekly return, W i,τ , which is the natural log of 1 plus the residual return from Equation (1).
The first measure of crash risk is denoted by CRASH, which is equal to 1 if a firm experiences one or more firm-specific weekly returns (i.e., W i,τ ) falling under 3.2 standard deviations below the mean firmspecific weekly returns for that fiscal year. This measure captures the probability of detecting extremely negative firm-specific weekly returns in a fiscal year.
Our second measure of crash risk, NCSKEW, is the negative of the third moment of firm-specific weekly returns. We calculate NCSKEW by taking the negative of the third moment of returns and dividing it by the standard deviation of returns raised to the third power. That is, for any firm i, in year t,
where n is the number of observations of firm i-specific weekly returns during year t.
Main model
Our hypotheses focus on the effect of internal control on crash risk. We estimate the following model to test our hypotheses: 
where PROXY_CRASH is CRASH t and NCSKEW t , respectively. CRASH t is a dummy variable indicating whether there is a crash of stock price in a specific fiscal year for the firm. NCSKEW t is the negative coefficient of skewness. IC_INDEX t is the Chinese Internal Control Index. Based on prior research, we control for several firm characteristics that affect the risk of price crash. DTURN t-1 is the difference between average monthly share turnover over the fiscal year and that over the previous fiscal year. This variable reflects investor heterogeneity and is expected to be positively associated with crash risk (Chen, Hong and Stein, 2001; Kim, Li and Zhang, 2011a, b) . NCSKEW t-1 is lagged NCSKEW t and is documented to be positively correlated with crash risk. SIGMA t-1 is the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns over fiscal year t-1, which is a proxy for prior stock return volatility. An increase in volatility is associated with an increase in one-year-ahead crash risk (Chen, Hong and Stein, 2001; Kim, Li and Zhang, 2011a) . RET t-1 is the mean of firm-specific weekly returns over year t-1, times 100. Firms with high past returns are more prone to price crash in the current year (Chen, Hong and Stein, 2001 ; Kim, Li and Zhang, 3 3 32 2 2 , , , 
Industry and year fixed effects are also controlled in this model. Our hypotheses (H1a to H1e) predict that crash risk decreases with the quality of the five components of internal control. Thus, we expect γ 1 , γ 2 , γ 3 , γ 4 , and γ 5 to be negative. 
Empirical Results
Descriptive statistics
Hypothesis tests
Effects of internal control on crash risk
Our central hypothesis predicts that companies with better internal control have lower crash risk. Table 3 presents the results of hypothesis testing. The IC_INDEX coefficients are uniformly negative and significant at 5% or 1% in each of the models, which strongly supports the main hypothesis. Our results remain qualitatively unchanged when different measures of crash risk are used, as suggested in prior research. The negative IC_INDEX coefficient means that crash risk is lower when internal control is stronger. Moreover, our results indicate the economic significance of the effects of internal control on crash risk. For example, based on the coefficients in the second regression in Table 3 , it is estimated that when internal control quality increases from the first to the third quartile, the crash risk proxy NCSKEW decreases by 0.034, which is 19.73% of the median value of NCSKEW. Overall, this result suggests that companies suffer less price crash when they are equipped with a stronger internal control system.
The results for the control variables are consistent with expectations and generally consistent with the results of prior research. For example, the positive coefficients on lagged return (RET t-1 ) and lagged market-to-book ratio (MB t-1 ) in Column (1) and Column (2) are consistent with prior studies on crash risk (Chen, Hong and Stein, 2001; Kim, Li and Zhang, 2011a, b; Zhou, Kim, and Yeung, 2014) .
[Insert Table 3 Here]
Effects of the five components of internal control on crash risk
We further examine the effects of the five components of internal control on crash risk. Table 4 presents the results of the tests. The coefficients of CtrEnv are negative and significant at the 5% or 1% levels in Panels A and B. Thus, the control environment helps reduce crash risk. The InfoCom variable is negative and significant at the 5% level in both Columns (4) and (6) in Panel A. For the Monitor variable, we find the coefficient negative and significant at the 1% level in both Columns (5) and (6) in Panel B.
We do not find significantly negative results associated with the RISK and CtrAct variables in either panel.
Our findings indicate that control environment, information and communication, and monitoring components significantly reduce crash risk. In contrast, risk assessment and control activity components do not show a relation to crash risk. Overall, among the five components of internal control, control environment, monitoring, information and communication are more relevant, while risk assessment and control activity components are less relevant in controlling bad news withholding.
[Insert Table 4 Here]
Robustness tests on endogeneity
Our analysis suggests a negative association between internal control and crash risk. However, our empirical tests could suffer from endogeneity problems. Endogeneity can arise because of unobservable heterogeneity when unobservable firm-specific factors influence both internal control and crash risk. In addition, we use lagged IC_INDEX to mitigate the problem of simultaneity or reverse causality, but we remain concerned about the simultaneity because IC_INDEX is sticky across years. Thus, we perform a two-stage least square estimation to address these issues. Roberts and Whited (2012) suggest that a proper instrument must satisfy both relevance and exclusion conditions. Following these criteria, we use the average IC_INDEX of other firms in the same industry as the instrumental variable. We report the results of the instrumental variable approach in Panel A in Table 5 . The coefficients on the fitted value of the internal control index (IC_INDEX_HAT) are significantly negative for both measures of crash risk. Thus, the negative association between internal control and crash risk holds after controlling for endogeneity based on the instrumental variable methodology.
In addition, we use internal control quality in the preceding period to assuage the potential simultaneity problem. We report the results in Panel B of Table 5 . The coefficients on IC_INDEX t-1 are significantly negative for both measures for crash risk. Thus, the negative association between internal control and crash risk holds after using lagged internal control quality to assuage the simultaneity problem.
Following Zhou, Kim, and Yeung (2014), we include determinants of internal control quality as additional control variables in our regression to mitigate the endogeneity problem. These variables include the proportion of loss years in the prior three years (LOSS), foreign sales (FSALE), number of business segments (SEGMENTS), restructuring charge (RESTRUCTURE), big four audit (BIG4), and auditor change (AUDCHANGE). The definitions of these variables are in Appendix B. We report the results in Panel C of Table 5 . The coefficients on IC_INDEX are significantly negative for both measures of crash risk. Thus, the negative association between internal control and future crash risk holds after including additional control variables to assuage the endogeneity problem.
Finally, we include firm fixed effects to account for unobservable, time invariant, firm-specific factors that may affect crash risk, to assuage the endogeneity problem. We report the results in Panel D of Table 5 . The coefficients on IC_INDEX are significantly negative for both measures of crash risk. Thus, our results are robust to including firm fixed effects.
[Insert Table 5 Here]
Additional tests
Section 4.2 above suggests that internal controls affect crash risk by either limiting bad news withholding behavior or by reducing the probability of extreme negative events. In this section, we select factors that can influence the effects of internal control mechanisms on the bad news withholding behavior of managers and the effects of extreme negative events. We further investigate whether these factors affect the association between internal control and crash risk as our predicted directions. We select auditing as internal governance and market development as external governance mechanisms that can substitute for internal control in reducing crash risk. Accounting conservatism is selected to proxy firm ability to limit bad news withholding. Finally, ownership structure is selected as a factor that can affect the ability of firms to mitigate the effects of extreme negative events. For brevity, the results for additional tests are confined to the internal control index rather than the components.
Effect of Big Four audit firms
Companies must be audited to protect market participants. Prior studies show that auditors monitor financial reporting preparation (Becker et al., 1998; Lennox and Pittman, 2010) and provide advice on the internal control of companies. We test the role of auditor monitoring in the association between internal control and crash risk in this section. Dye (1993) indicates that the expected cost of litigation is greater for Big Four auditors than for non-Big Four auditors, especially when companies are bankrupt. Thus, Big
Four auditors may have strong incentives to push companies to disclose bad news in a timely manner and to provide suggestions to help companies minimize the emergence and effects of extreme negative events.
Internal control can play an important role in reducing crash risk when high-quality auditing is unavailable. Therefore, we predict that the auditor substitutes for internal control in lowering crash risk.
We divide the sample into two subsamples based on whether the auditor is a Big Four firm. As shown in Table 6 , the coefficients of IC_INDEX t are negative and significant when firms are audited by non-Big Four auditors (BIG4 = 0) in Columns (2) and (4). In contrast, the same set of coefficients for firms with Big Four auditors (BIG4 = 1) is not significant. 5 Overall, this result suggests that the auditor is likely to serve as a substitute for internal control in reducing crash risk.
[Insert Table 6 Here]
Effect of market development
China has great disparities in external monitoring mechanisms across regions. We further explore whether regional differences in external monitoring affect the association between internal control and crash risk. We use the regional marketization index, which measures the progress of institutional transformation in the 31 provinces of China. 6 Additionally, we identify differences in institutions and economic policies across provinces. Fan, Wang, and Ma (2011) provide the indices across the 31 provinces. A high index value indicates a better external monitoring environment. We argue that strong external monitoring mechanisms substitute for internal control systems in reducing crash risk. Thus, we predict that the negative association between internal control and crash risk is more pronounced for firms in provinces with low market development than those in provinces with high market development.
We divide the sample into two subsamples based on whether a firm is located in a province with a marketization index lower than the sample median. As shown in Table 7 , the coefficients of IC_INDEX t are all negative and significant when the firms are in provinces with low market development (MKT = 0).
In contrast, the same set of coefficients for firms in provinces with high market development (MKT = 1) is insignificant. Overall, the results suggest that the association between internal control and crash risk is significantly negative, mainly in provinces with weak external monitoring (i.e., lower market development).
[Insert Table 7 Here]
Effect of conditional accounting conservatism
Conditional accounting conservatism is interpreted as capturing accountants' tendency to require a higher degree of verification to recognize good news as gains than to recognize bad news as losses (Basu, 1997) . This asymmetric verifiability requirement of accounting conservatism weakens managers' incentive and ability to overstate performance and suppress the disclosure of bad news (Watts, 2003; Kothari et al., 2010) . Kim and Zhang (2015) document that firms with more conservative accounting policies have lower likelihood of future stock price crashes. We expect that firms applying less accounting conservatism accumulate more negative news and thus are more vulnerable to extreme negative events because their ability to absorb negative news is weaker. Thus, we expect that the negative association between internal control quality and crash risk is more pronounced for firms applying less accounting conservatism.
To capture firm-year level conservatism, we follow Kim and Zhang (2015) and Khan and Watts (2009) and use the following model:
where X is net income scaled by lagged market value of equity; R is compound returns over the 12-month period ending at fiscal yearend; D is an indicator that equals 1 if the return is negative, zero otherwise;
MKV is the natural log of market value; MB is the ratio of market value to book value of equity; LEV is debt-to-equity ratio; i indexes firm; and ε is the residual. We then calculate CSCORE using the following model:
We build a dummy variable HCON, which equals 1 if CSCORE of the preceding fiscal year is above the sample median, zero otherwise, and we divide the sample into two subsamples based on whether accounting conservatism is above the sample median. As shown in Table 8 , the coefficients of IC_INDEX t are all negative and significant for firms applying less accounting conservatism (HCON = 0).
In contrast, the same set of coefficients for firms applying more accounting conservatism (HCON = 1) is insignificant. Overall, the results suggest that firms with less accounting conservatism are more susceptible to the effect of internal control on crash risk. Table 8 Here]
Effect of ownership
Prior studies report that SOEs can receive aid from the government when they are affected by extreme negative events. SOEs can receive support from the government and attempt to avoid crash risk when they are affected by extreme negative events because of weak internal control. Thus, we predict that the negative association between internal control and crash risk is more pronounced for non-SOEs than SOEs.
We divide the sample into two subsamples based on whether a firm is state owned. As shown in Table 9 , the coefficients of IC_INDEX t are all negative and significant for non-SOEs (SOE = 0). In contrast, the same set of coefficients for SOEs (SOE = 1) is insignificant. Overall, our results indicate that the association between internal control and crash risk is confined to non-SOEs.
[Insert Table 9 Here]
Conclusion
We investigate whether internal control and its five components affect crash risk. Consistent with our prediction, we find that the quality of internal control is negatively associated with crash risk. Our results are robust to alternative proxies for crash risk and different econometric designs. Our results are consistent with the notion that internal control can curtail executive withholding of bad news, so that the likelihood of a stock price crash is less.
In addition, our findings suggest that not every component of internal control is equal. We document that control environment, information and communication, and monitoring components significantly reduce crash risk. In contrast, risk assessment and control activity components do not relate to crash risk.
The differing results from different components of internal control show that, among the five components of internal control, control environment, monitoring, and information and communication are more relevant, while risk assessment and control activity components are less relevant in controlling bad news withholding.
We find that internal and external governance moderate the association between internal control quality and crash risk. That is, firms with weak auditing quality and poor market development have lower ability to mitigate the effect of extreme negative events. These results are consistent with the notion that the role of internal control in reducing crash risk is a partial substitute of high-quality auditing and external monitoring. These findings strengthen our conclusions, because they assuage the concern that the negative association between internal control and crash risk is driven by firms with both good internal control and strong corporate governance. Overall, this study documents evidence supporting the view that internal control limits the ability of managers to conceal bad news and helps reduce the probability of extreme negative events, which consequently lead to lower crash risk.
This study adds to the growing literature on internal control and its implications for managers and investors. We focus on the unique role of internal control in lowering crash risk and generate evidence on the capital market consequences of internal control. We also extend previous studies on crash risk by identifying a new factor that is significantly associated with crash risk. Thus, we uncover useful implications for managers and investors who wish to manage crash risk in the stock market. (2) Yili Group
Yili Group is a dairy product company in China. In September 2008, Yili had a recall of its milk products because its infant formula contained melamine (a toxic chemical normally used in making plastics and tanning leather). It was found that suppliers of milk to dairy companies used melamine to disguise diluted milk to make protein levels of the milk appear higher than they really were, allowing producers to cut costs by diluting their products. 
RET t-1
Mean value of the firm-specific-weekly return over the fiscal year t-1, times 100
LEV t-1
Leverage of the firm is measured by the debt-to-equity ratio over the fiscal year t-1 
Market value of equity divided by book value of equity at the end of fiscal year t-1
ROA t-1
Income before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets at the end of fiscal year t-1
ACCM t-1
Prior three years' moving sum of the absolute value of discretionary accruals, where discretionary accruals are estimated from the Modified Jones Model (Dechow et al. (1995) )
Zmijevski t-1
Zmijewski's risk score (Zmijewski (1984) )
The proportion of loss years in the prior three years
FSALES t-1
An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm has foreign sales at the end of fiscal year t-1and 0 otherwise
The natural log of one plus the number of reported business segments at the end of fiscal year t-1 
Construction of Internal Control Index
We use the Chinese Internal Control Index, which is denoted by IC_INDEX, to measure the quality (1) Hierarchy Construction
The first step is to model the internal control evaluation problem as a hierarchy. First, we analyze the decision problem in-depth, extracting relevant factors and determining the relations among different factors. Second, we arrange different factors into an analytic hierarchy, in which each factor belongs to a particular hierarchy and is assigned to a factor in the upper hierarchy. The internal control evaluation system contains five hierarchies in the following top-to-bottom order: overall objectives, sub-objectives, standards, sub-standards, and plan executions.
(2) Judgment Matrix After the hierarchy is constructed for evaluation of internal control, pairwise comparisons of the same-level items are performed for the sub-objective level, analyzing their relative importance to the same assigned elements in the hierarchy above them. Once the comparison is finished, each of the two items receives a score according to its relative importance. To perform the pairwise comparisons, we establish a judgment matrix according to Saaty's AHP 1-9 Scale (Saaty, 1988) . The AHP 1-9 Scale is aimed at enhancing judgment accuracy and, therefore, weight credibility. Delphi method is applied to create the judgment matrix. Experts compare the relative importance between two factors and assign a value to each factor based on AHP 1-9 Scale. For example, if control activities is evaluated to "be slightly more important" than monitoring, then the value for control activities is 3 while the value of monitoring is 1/3. The remainders of the values are given analogously.
(3) Weight Calculation and Consistency Check
The objective evaluation method is applied to calculate the weight based on observed values. The objective evaluation method uses the variation coefficient that reflects the differences in information between items to calculate the weight. We use the aforementioned methods to obtain the weight for each item in the hierarchy.
(4) Calculation of Internal Control Index
The internal control index is based on the observed values and calculated weights. It is the weighted average of each item. For those items whose scores are listed as "To be standardized" at the fourth level, the standardized score is calculated as the actual score on this item for the evaluated firm divided by the maximum score on the same item from all the listed companies. The weighted average calculation method is as follows. where IC_INDEX is the overall internal control index, IC 1 is the control environment index, IC 2 is the risk assessment index, IC 3 is the control activities index, IC 4 is the information and communication index, IC 5 is the monitoring index, and w i is the weight of the i th item at the first level (i=1,2,3,4,5). In addition,
)*(1-p i ), i=1,2,3,4,5; j=1,2,3,...,n where IC i,j is the value of the j th item at the fourth level associated with the i th item at the first level, w i,j is the impact of the j th item at the fourth level on the associated i th item at the first level. P i is the deduction ratio of the special category-punishment or other negative events-at the first level. The final internal control index is a percentage score with a maximum value of 100% and a minimum value of 0%. 
( 1) Notes: The dependent variables in the table are proxies for crash risk, which are CRASH and NCSKEW respectively. CRASH equals one if a firm experiences one or more firm-specific weekly returns (i.e., W i, τ) falling 3.2 standard deviations below the mean firm-specific weekly returns for that fiscal year. NCSKEW is computed by taking the negative of third moment of returns and dividing it by the standard deviation of returns raised to the third power. IC_INDEX is constructed by the internal control research center of Xiamen University. The values of IC_INDEX range from 0 to 1 and a higher value of IC_INDEX corresponds to higher quality of internal control. See Appendix B for the definitions of other variables. The standard errors are adjusted for clustering by firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level or better, respectively (two tailed). Notes: The dependent variables in the table are proxies for crash risk, which are CRASH and NCSKEW respectively. CRASH equals one if a firm experiences one or more firm-specific weekly returns (i.e., W i, τ) falling 3.2 standard deviations below the mean firm-specific weekly returns for that fiscal year. NCSKEW is computed by taking the negative of third moment of returns and dividing it by the standard deviation of returns raised to the third power. IC_INDEX is constructed by the internal control research center of Xiamen University. The values of IC_INDEX range from 0 to 1 and a higher value of IC_INDEX corresponds to higher quality of internal control. CtrEnv, RISK, CtrAct, InfoCom, and MONITOR are the five components separated from IC_INDEX, with their values range from 0 to 1. Higher values of the five sub-indexes correspond to higher quality of internal control. MKT equals one if the firm is located in a province with marketization index below the sample median, zero otherwise. See Appendix B for the definitions of other variables. The standard errors are adjusted for clustering by firm. **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level or better, respectively (two tailed). Notes: The dependent variables in the table are proxies for crash risk, which are CRASH and NCSKEW respectively. CRASH equals one if a firm experiences one or more firm-specific weekly returns (i.e., W i, τ) falling 3.2 standard deviations below the mean firm-specific weekly returns for that fiscal year. NCSKEW is computed by taking the negative of third moment of returns and dividing it by the standard deviation of returns raised to the third power. IC_INDEX is constructed by the internal control research center of Xiamen University. The values of IC_INDEX range from 0 to 1 and a higher value of IC_INDEX corresponds to higher quality of internal control. CtrEnv, RISK, CtrAct, InfoCom, and MONITOR are the five components separated from IC_INDEX, with their values range from 0 to 1. Higher values of the five sub-indexes correspond to higher quality of internal control. HCon equals one if the extent of accounting conservatism is above sample median, zero otherwise. Accounting conservatism is proxied by CSCORE which is calculated by following Khan and Watts (2009) and Kim and Zhang (2015) . A higher CSCORE indicates more accounting conservatism. See Appendix B for the definitions of other variables. The standard errors are adjusted for clustering by firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level or better, respectively (two tailed). Notes: The dependent variables in the table are proxies for crash risk, which are CRASH and NCSKEW respectively. CRASH equals one if a firm experiences one or more firm-specific weekly returns (i.e., W i, τ) falling 3.2 standard deviations below the mean firm-specific weekly returns for that fiscal year. NCSKEW is computed by taking the negative of third moment of returns and dividing it by the standard deviation of returns raised to the third power. IC_INDEX is constructed by the internal control research center of Xiamen University. The values of IC_INDEX range from 0 to 1 and a higher value of IC_INDEX corresponds to higher quality of internal control. CtrEnv, RISK, CtrAct, InfoCom, and MONITOR are the five components separated from IC_INDEX, with their values range from 0 to 1. Higher values of the five sub-indexes correspond to higher quality of internal control. SOE equals one if the firm is state-owned, zero otherwise. See Appendix B for the definitions of other variables. The standard errors are adjusted for clustering by firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level or better, respectively (two tailed).
